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NOTES
STOP  THE  REACH:  SOLVING  THE  JUDICIAL




The Supreme Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence has evolved to
require compensation, not just for eminent domain, but also for governmen-
tal regulations1—a shift that has roughly coincided with the Supreme Court’s
evolving understanding of the limits on state and federal government power.
After the New Deal, the scope of constitutionally permissible exercises of gov-
ernmental power has dramatically expanded.2  Takings Clause jurispru-
dence, in developing from mere compensation for physical appropriations to
cover various forms of regulatory takings, has functioned as an important
safety valve3 to the growing dominance of collective interests, enshrined into
law at the expense of individual property rights.4  The doctrine of judicial
takings could serve a similarly important function in limiting the reach of
* University of Notre Dame Law School, J.D. Candidate 2016.  Special thanks to
Notre Dame Law Professor Daniel B. Kelly for his thoughtful comments and critiques.
1 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118–25 (1942) (invalidating the com-
merce clause doctrine articulated in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 64–65 (1824)).
3 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (noting that the aim of the
Takings Clause is to prevent the government “from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”).
4 Importantly, some have viewed the Takings Clause as not only a safety valve for
governmental oppression, but as a means of obtaining economically efficient outcomes,
and that such efficiency calculations should guide our takings doctrines. See, e.g., Christo-
pher Serkin, Transition Relief from Judge-Made Law: The Incentives of Judicial Takings, 21 WID-
ENER L.J. 777, 778 (2012) (“On the one hand, the absence of compensation may induce
risk-averse property owners to underinvest in their property.  On the other, compensation
may create a kind of moral hazard, allowing property owners to discount or ignore risks
that they should, in fact, consider. . . . [T]he Takings Clause functions as a form of transi-
tion relief, and examines how protecting property owners from the costs of legal change
can induce inefficient investment incentives.”).
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lower courts that refuse to protect private property in their application of the
law, but in order for the Court to instantiate a unified judicial takings doc-
trine, it must first settle a presuppositional question that has, perhaps
unknowingly, deeply divided the Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection5—namely, how should a court
define property?
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that “private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”6  The
increasing number of regulatory encroachments on property by the modern
state has not nullified the utility of the Takings Clause because the courts
have adopted a more nuanced understanding what property actually is—a
“bundle of rights,” rather than a “thing.”7  The question of eminent domain
is, “Has a physical object or plot of land been taken?”8  But the question of
regulatory takings is broader: “Have enough sticks in the bundle of property
rights been taken so as to conclude that the thing in question has in effect
been taken?”9  The “bundle of rights” theory of property conceptually
expands the reach of the Takings Clause.  Consequently, just compensation
is available to property owners in the face of a growing public sector, despite
the fact that many government actions do not involve physical
appropriations.10
5 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7 It may be that the bundle of rights theory was contrived in order to undermine the
more “absolutist” conception of property articulated by Blackstone and secured by the
English common law—to change “American law and politics to adapt to changing eco-
nomic and social conditions to achieve social justice.”  Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the
Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 247–53 (2007) (arguing for the necessity of the bundle
theory over the Blackstonian physicalist theory in order to justify socially desirable govern-
mental encroachments upon private property).  But even if that is the case, a movement
away from the “physicalist” notion of property rights, conceptually focusing on the discrete
rights inherent in the thing rather than the thing itself, has paradoxically unchained prop-
erty law to adapt its protections for the individual to modern circumstances—to expand to
encompass, for example, “intangible property such as business goodwill, trademarks, trade
secrets, and shares of corporations,” among other things. See id.
8 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (holding that the Takings
Clause protects both real and personal property from physical appropriation without just
compensation).
9 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–17 (1992) (holding that regu-
lations that deprive property of all beneficial use are “the equivalent of a physical
appropriation”).
10 This does not do violence to the original meaning of the Takings Clause, but rather
adapts the Clause to reality, which is that modern regulatory acts can be substantially the
same thing as a physical appropriation. See generally Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (providing per se
compensation for a taking of the right to use); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (providing per se compensation for a taking of the right to
exclude).  But see James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, The Use of Theory Making and Doctrine
Making of Regulatory Takings Theory to Examine the Needs, Reasons, and Arguments to Establish
Judicial Takings Theory, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 191, 204 (2013) (“Justice Holmes stated
that ‘this [doctrine of regulatory takings goes] beyond any of the cases decided by this
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Moreover, in developing the doctrine of “regulatory takings” over time,
the Court has paid no attention to which branch of government effects the
taking—the sum total of its concern has been whether private property has
been taken for public use, in which case the Takings Clause applies.11  There-
fore, the proposed doctrine of judicial takings, proffered by Justice Scalia in
his plurality opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, is actually a rather hum-
drum application of the doctrine of regulatory takings in the judicial context.12
As Professor Ilya Somin put it rather succinctly, “Although the definition and
enforcement of a judicial takings doctrine poses genuine challenges, these
difficulties are fundamentally similar to those presented by other takings
claims.”13  Nevertheless, both Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, writing separately, declined to explicitly define property in the
same way as previous regulatory takings cases.  Rather than focusing on essen-
tial characteristics of property, such as the right to exclude or use, the Jus-
tices deferred in varying degrees to state definitions of property.14
There are three potential approaches to defining property in a Takings
Clause analysis.  The first might be called the Positivist Approach, where the
history of lower-court precedents, defining a state common law right as “A,”
are treated by the Supreme Court as dispositive on what property rights actu-
ally exist within the state, such that when the petitioner claims that his com-
mon law rights were actually “B” before the judgment, the Court must defer
to the state court’s interpretation and deny relief.  The Positivist Approach is
self-defeating, leading to what Professor Merrill calls the “positivist trap,”15
where the application of regulatory takings in the judicial context would
Court.’  Justice Holmes concluded that the takings issue in Pennsylvania Coal Co. was [a]
unique and . . . new takings theory.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) (“The original
understanding of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was clear on two points.
The clause required compensation when the federal government physically took private
property, but not when government regulations limited the ways in which property could
be used.” (footnote omitted)).
11 See Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem of Judicial Takings, 6
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 96 (2011) (“In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Justice
Scalia cites the case of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, in which the Court concluded
that a state property-law ruling violated the First Amendment rights of protestors.  The text
of the Fifth Amendment does not distinguish between courts and legislatures any more
than that of the First Amendment.” (footnotes omitted)).
12 Some have attempted to argue that the judicial branch is different enough from the
other branches to justify refusing to extend the doctrine of regulatory takings to the judici-
ary. See John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is Different,
35 VT. L. REV. 475, 487–88, 493 (2010).
13 Somin, supra note 11, at 106.
14 See infra Sections III.B, C.
15 Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 922
(2000).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL308.txt unknown Seq: 4 31-MAR-16 9:48
1200 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
become a theoretical impossibility.16  Justice Kennedy flirts with this
approach, as evidenced by his willingness to accept the right of state courts to
“change” the common law.17
The second might be called the Undefined Approach, where the history
of lower-court precedents, defining the common law rights as “A,” are mea-
sured against the Court’s own definition of what property rights, “B,” existed
before the judgment.  In this approach, the Court reserves the right to define
property in whatever manner it chooses.  Justice Scalia adopts this approach,
leaving open the question how “B” should be defined—either as an “estab-
lished” common law property right, or something else entirely.18
The third might be called the Definitional Approach, where the history
of lower-court precedents, defining the common law rights as “A,” are mea-
sured against the Court’s own definition of what objective property rights,
“B,” existed before the judgment.  The Court here would define B neither as
simply an “established” right at the state level, nor as merely something in
which the claimant has a reasonable economic expectation.  Instead, the
Court would set forth a definition of property that includes primarily (1)
objective, essential qualities of property, and secondarily (2) established prin-
ciples of property within the state’s judicial precedent.19
16 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash
Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 37, 42 (2011) (“Only if these common-law property rights have constitutional status
does the takings inquiry make sense.  If littoral rights were just a creature of the state, such
that they could be created or cancelled at will, then the entire structure of littoral rights,
indeed all property rights, would come tumbling down. . . . [The state] could create or
displace any system of entitlements, whether on land or water, by a simple assertion of
collective political will.”).
17 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
736 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“State courts generally operate under a common-
law tradition that allows for incremental modifications to property law.”); see also Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]f the
owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of
governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is. . . . The Takings
Clause does not require a static body of state property law.”); Nestor M. Davidson, Judicial
Takings and State Action: Rereading Shelley After Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 76–77 (2011) (“On the one hand, private property is under-
stood as relatively fixed according to long-standing common-law doctrine that reflects
almost pre-political norms of ownership and exclusion—a view to which Justice Scalia
seems to subscribe.  On the other hand, some Justices seem to embrace a more legal realist
approach that recognizes . . . the inherent centrality of the state in defining and moderat-
ing this aspect of private ordering.”); John G. Sprankling, The Property Jurisprudence of Justice
Kennedy, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 61, 68 (2013) (noting that Justice Kennedy “forg[es] a
rough compromise between natural law and legal positivism”).
18 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 715; id. at 735 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19 However, these are not hermetically sealed categories, as natural rights often have
an ancient legal pedigree. See Epstein, supra note 16, at 48–49 (“The 1904 Farnham trea-
tise, for example, contains references to rights that are jure naturae, by the right of nature.
‘The right to future alluvial formation or batture is a vested right, inherent in the property
itself, and forming an essential attribute of it, resulting from natural law . . . .’  This exten-
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The Definitional Approach potentially resolves the dispute between Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy about whether to apply the Due Process Clause or
the Takings Clause when something that looks like a judicial taking occurs.
Moreover, it addresses the concerns and reservations held by both Justices in
their opinions.
Justice Kennedy primarily fears that allowing courts to overturn settled
common law principles, provided they give just compensation, would grant
license to lower courts to ignore the common law.20  However, the Defini-
tional Approach would allow the Court to use a “sliding scale”: ordinary judi-
cial takings would receive compensation, while extraordinary judicial
takings—those takings that are completely arbitrary or irrational—could sim-
ply be reversed as a matter of due process.  This would satisfy Justice Ken-
nedy’s desire to prevent lower-court abuses, while rendering moot his arcane
dispute with Justice Scalia over whether the common law can “change.”21
Likewise, Justice Scalia’s fear of ad hoc substantive due process balancing
tests22 would be partially allayed, since only the most egregious takings of
common law property rights would become the subject of a Due Process
Clause analysis.23  All other such takings would fall squarely within the Tak-
ings Clause, a more conceptually manageable rule.24
Justice Kennedy also fears the potential scope of judicial takings and the
impact that the doctrine would have on the freedom of states to develop
their common law of property.25  Admittedly, the Definitional Approach
would give judicial takings a generous reach; however, this reach would go no
sive reliance on the natural law dates back to Roman times, where the laws of alluvion and
avulsion were part of the natural law as defined by Gaius and Justinian in their respective
Institutes.” (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 73, at 330 n.3 (1904))).
20 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t is
conceivable that some judges might decide that enacting a sweeping new rule to adjust the
rights of property owners in the context of changing social needs is a good idea.  Knowing
that the resulting ruling would be a taking, the courts could go ahead with their project,
free from constraints that would otherwise confine their power.”).
21 See id. at 722 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Framers did not envision the Takings
Clause would apply to judicial action . . . since the Constitution was adopted in an era when
courts had no power to ‘change’ the common law.”); cf. id. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (“[The] common-law tradition . . . allows for incremental modifications to property
law.”).
22 See id. at 724 (plurality opinion) (criticizing Justice Kennedy’s “extremely vague
applications of substantive due process”).
23 It should be noted that the Takings Clause already involves ad hoc balancing, as well
as conceptual ipse dixits—in particular, deciding the spatial denominator within the prop-
erty against which the regulatory taking will be judged for purposes of a per se takings
analysis. See infra Section I.A.  Therefore, adding an additional layer of judicial “gut check-
ing” for the most outrageous abuses of judicial authority might not be altogether unpalat-
able for a Justice who appears to accept current Takings Clause jurisprudence.
24 A takings analysis begins by asking whether a per se taking has occurred, and if not,
applies a three-factor balancing test. See infra Section I.C.
25 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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further than prior regulatory takings cases.26  Moreover, providing compen-
sation for judicial appropriations of property—those that, according to the
sliding scale, stop short of an egregious overthrow of a common law right27—
would not necessarily stifle common law development.  Rather, compensa-
tion would force the government to pay property owners when a court
refused to recognize property interests that were clearly definable, either by
reference to essential characteristics of property or state judicial precedent.
The future of judicial takings may rest on the ability of the Court to
define property in a robust and objective way.28  Property has essential char-
acteristics that make it easily identifiable, the most significant of which are
the rights to exclude and use.  However, even when a property right does not
fit within a neat categorical definition, should that right have a long, well-
established pedigree in state court precedent,29 that property right is simi-
larly within the capacity of the reviewing court to identify.  And once it is
determined that, prior to the judgment, the petitioners possessed a clearly
defined property right, and that after the judgment, they were divested of
that right, then a regulatory taking has occurred.  Then the legal question
boils down to compensation.  In other words, the initial definitional question
is essential to the question whether there is any judicial taking at all.
In this Note I propose a unified judicial takings doctrine that accounts
for all of the relevant concerns dividing Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Stop
the Beach Renourishment.  Part I addresses the evolution of the Court’s regula-
tory takings jurisprudence.  Part II surveys the Court’s definition of property
in the Due Process arena.  Part III analyzes the dispute between Justices
Scalia and Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment and proposes a compro-
mise judicial takings theory—a “sliding scale” test—that might unify the two
factions.  Part IV addresses potential criticisms of the Definitional Approach.
26 The Definitional Approach, as this Note understands it, merely defines property in
the same manner as prior regulatory takings cases—placing a primary emphasis on objec-
tive, essential qualities of property, such as the right to exclude and use.
27 For a possible example of an overthrow of established property principles, see gen-
erally State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (holding that there is no right to exclude
government officers seeking to provide public services to migrant workers housed on pri-
vate property). But see Stephanie Stern, Protecting Property Through Politics: State Legislative
Checks and Judicial Takings, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2176, 2188–89 (2013) (“When state court
holdings are truly radical, they are often narrowed over time as subsequent cases carve out
exceptions and limit the precedent.  For example, the activist nature of State v. Shack and
its sharp departure from precedent are renowned, but not the decision’s erosion in a line
of subsequent New Jersey cases.” (footnote omitted)).
28 Other solutions for resolving this dispute have been proposed: one possibility might
be to use judicial takings for an intentional seizure of private property, but due process for
unintentional and/or irrational seizures. See Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 305 (2012).
29 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 728 (plurality opinion) (noting that
“judicial elimination of established private-property rights that is foreshadowed by dicta or
even by holdings years in advance is nonetheless a taking”).
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I. THE DEFINITIONAL APPROACH IN TAKINGS CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Given that judicial takings would be a species of regulatory takings,30 it is
helpful to set judicial takings in the context of the Court’s evolving regulatory
takings jurisprudence.  The story of judicial takings begins with the first ever
extension of the Takings Clause from eminent domain to mere regulatory
actions.  The simplest application of the Takings Clause involves a physical
appropriation of tangible property.  It involves no philosophical speculation
or conceptual line drawing—either a government has taken possession of
property, or it has not.  With eminent domain, property is very easily defined;
it is a physical object or parcel of land.  The owner is divested of every one of
his property interests: to exclude, use, abandon, destroy, transfer, etc.  How-
ever, the doctrine of regulatory takings is not so clean cut and poses unique
conceptual challenges in its application.
A. Pennsylvania Coal and the Takings Clause Transformation
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,31 Pennsylvania imposed a
regulation forbidding the mining of certain coal pillars so as to prevent subsi-
dence of the ground above the coal mine.32  The regulation was clearly
within the police powers of the state, enforced for the safety of those residing
above the coal mine.33  The regulation, however, decreased the economic
value of the coal mine.34  The mining company in Penn Coal purchased sub-
surface mineral rights for the sole purpose of extracting the minerals for sale
on the market; therefore, when the government declared that certain por-
tions of its physical property could no longer be used for mining, those por-
tions became utterly valueless to the coal company.35  While the government
had not entered onto the property and taken physical possession of the coal
pillars, its actions had the same effect—with respect to the coal pillars, the gov-
ernment had completely divested the property owner of the right to use the
property.36  On this basis, a majority of the Court, led by Justice Holmes,
declared the government regulation to be a taking.37
The dissent in Pennsylvania Coal was not convinced.38  From the dissent’s
perspective, the governmental regulation had only affected a small portion of
the property.39  Thus, applying the Takings Clause in similar circumstances
would unduly burden the police power of a state, since the state government
would have to compensate property owners for any action that even partly
30 See supra text accompanying notes 11–13.
31 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
32 See id. at 412–13.
33 See id. at 413.
34 Id. at 414.
35 See id. at 414.
36 See id.
37 Id. at 414–15.
38 See id. at 416–18 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39 See id. at 419.
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reduced its economic value.40  As we will see in later cases, this concern
about an overly expansive doctrine of regulatory takings remains a cardinal
fear of the Court: if the only property interest that is being affected is the
right to use, the court is hesitant to find a taking unless the right to use is
entirely divested.41  However, this creates what might be called a numerator-
denominator problem: if the denominator is the entire property, a divestment
of the right to use a portion of the property is not necessarily a taking; but, if
the denominator is only a portion of the property, the divestment of that por-
tion of the property is necessarily a taking—because it takes the entire prop-
erty under consideration.  How does the Court initially determine which
denominator to use?  There is no principled way to answer this question.
Making the denominator too large would undermine the ability of the courts
to require compensation for regulatory takings, but making the denominator
too small would impose too great a burden on states in the legitimate exer-
cise of their police power.  So it is with regulatory takings, that when the right
to use property is at stake, it is inherently an ad hoc inquiry.42
B. Definitional Clarity and the Doctrine of Per Se Takings
The Supreme Court further developed regulatory takings in the context
of the right to use in the case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.43  In
that case, the state of South Carolina passed a law prohibiting all property
development on those portions of beachfront properties beyond a certain
line.44  The trial court found that this permanently reduced the value of the
property beyond the line to zero,45 but the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed.46  The U.S. Supreme Court then reversed the South Carolina
Supreme Court, agreeing with the trial court that this regulation was in fact a
taking, since it was the functional equivalent of a physical appropriation.47
The Court did, however, issue a caveat: if the restriction “inhere[s] in the
title itself,” or is part of “background principles of the State’s law of property
and nuisance [that] already place upon land ownership,” then the depriva-
tion of economic use is not automatically a taking.48  This caveat makes emi-
nent sense, as there is no moral or common law right to use property in a way
40 See id.
41 See infra Section I.B.
42 See generally Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The Takings Clause Exemplar, 3
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 25 (2013) (commenting at length on the ad hoc nature of much
of the Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence).
43 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
44 See id. at 1008–09.
45 Id. at 1009.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1017–19.
48 Id. at 1029.
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that is a nuisance to others.  Therefore the law of nuisance, even if it reduces
the value of property to zero, cannot be a taking.49
A violation of the right to exclude, however, does not involve the ad hoc
conceptual line drawing of Penn Coal.  In the case of Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.,50 a government regulation called for the installation
of cable boxes on the roofs of private residences to expand access to cable.51
The Court concluded that the government action authorizing a permanent
physical occupation on the property—even on a small portion of the prop-
erty—was a regulatory taking on its face,52 because it divested the owner of
the right to exclude,53 as well as every other property right in the bundle of
rights.54  As the Court put it, a physical occupation does not remove one stick
from the bundle, but cuts through the entire bundle.55  Thus a regulation
that deprives a property owner of the right to exclude begins to look much
more like eminent domain.
C. Penn Central Balancing: The Ad Hoc Alternative
When not applying the per se takings test—either a destruction of all
economic value or a permanent physical occupation—the Court falls back
onto an ad hoc balancing test.  In the case of Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York,56 a zoning ordinance declared Penn Central Station a historic
landmark, placing limits upon additional construction on the property.57
The owners of Penn Station were planning to construct a high rise on top of
the station for the purpose of adding additional office space, but the regula-
tion divested the owners of the right to build in the air space above the prop-
erty,58 a right traditionally vested in property owners under the ad coelum
doctrine.  The Court ruled that the relevant denominator for analyzing the
takings claim was not the air space, but the entire property,59 and as a result
49 The Court’s early attempts at defining the limits of regulatory takings cleaved
closely to the law of nuisance. See generally Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (holding
that if the use of one property destroys another property deemed to be more valuable to
the public, the state may regulate the former, but must pay compensation).
50 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
51 Id. at 423–24.
52 See id. at 426–430 (distinguishing between “a permanent physical occupation, a
physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of
property.”); see also id. at 434 (finding no per se taking because the physical occupation was
not permanent (citing PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980))).
53 Id. at 433 (“[T]he landowner’s right to exclude [is] ‘one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” (quoting Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))).
54 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
55 Id.
56 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
57 Id. at 107–18.
58 Id. at 115–18, 130.
59 Id. at 130–131.
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found that the government had not deprived the property (that is, the whole
property) of all economic value.60
Finding no complete diminution of value, the Court went on to con-
sider, through a fact-bound inquiry,61 (1) the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant, (2) the degree of interference with investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the regulatory action.62  Therefore,
every takings analysis involves two steps: first, an analysis of whether there is a
per se taking under Loretto and Lucas, and second, if there is no per se taking,
whether the government sufficiently interfered with the property owner’s
legitimate economic expectations in the property to warrant compensation.
D. The Established Precedent of Defining Property in Regulatory Takings
The Court thus has a long history of, in the context of regulatory tak-
ings, defining property in an objective way.  Essential characteristics of prop-
erty form the backbone of the regulatory takings doctrine; economic
expectancies in the property are a secondary concern.  While the application
of regulatory takings involves a conceptual challenge in determining where
to set the property denominator in the takings analysis, once the Court has
set the denominator, it begins its application of the Takings Clause by defin-
ing the protected property interests at stake in a clear and self-evident way—
the right to exclude and use.  The Court’s takings jurisprudence appears to
privilege traditional, objective understandings of property, and this, as we will
see in the following Part, is consistent with its understanding of property in
the realm of due process, which has moved decidedly away from the Positivist
Approach toward a more full-throated Definitional Approach.
However, in spite of its long-standing confidence in defining property in
the per se takings context, the Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment conspicu-
ously shied away from the definitional prong in its newest adaptation of regu-
latory takings, the doctrine of judicial takings.63
II. THE DEFINITIONAL APPROACH IN DUE PROCESS DOCTRINE
Before considering how the Court neglected to define property in the
Stop the Beach Renourishment case and the impact that this has had on the
uncertain future of the judicial takings doctrine, it is also helpful to consider
the Court’s checkered history of wrestling with the problem of how to define
property in the realm of due process.
60 See id. at 136–38.
61 See id.
62 Id. at 124.
63 This is particularly vexing given the fact that Justice Scalia in his plurality opinion,
while beginning his analysis with a citation to Loretto, see Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010), subsequently ignores the right to
exclude and use in putting forth his proposed judicial takings doctrine. See infra Sections
III.A, B.
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A. The Rise and Fall of Pure Positivism in Due Process
The Constitution itself uses the word “property” in both the Takings and
Due Process Clauses,64 but it was not until 1972 that the Court began to
explicitly consider “property” as a prong in a due process or takings analy-
sis—that is, whether there is any constitutionally cognizable property
involved in a dispute.65  This change was precipitated by a judicial revolution
in Goldberg v. Kelly,66 where the Court eschewed the old rights-privileges dis-
tinction and began to recognize a vested property right in so-called “new
property”: economic expectancies created by positive law.67
In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,68 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that “property interests are not created by the Constitution, but
rather are created (and their dimensions defined by) nonconstitutional
sources such as state law.”69 Roth solidified the “new property” revolution;
though the Court denied a due process claim to a non-tenured public univer-
sity professor who was fired without notice or a hearing, it strongly affirmed
its belief that “property” was not tied down to any objective definition.70  In
striking consequentialist language, the Court declared that “[i]t is a purpose
of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily under-
mined.”71  While the Court conceded that “[t]o have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
it . . . [or] a unilateral expectation of it[,] . . . [but] a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it,”72 it nevertheless declined to tie down the definition of
property to any essential characteristics inhering in the property itself, such
as the right to exclude or use.73  Instead, the Roth Court defined property
according to the “independent source . . . [of] state law.”74  This created
what Professor Merrill calls the “positivist trap,” whereby “the procedures pre-
scribed by nonconstitutional law qualify the scope of the property right, and
64 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
65 See Merrill, supra note 15, at 887–88.
66 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
67 See Merrill, supra note 15, at 887, 918.
68 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
69 See Merrill, supra note 15, at 892.
70 See id. at 918–22.  Indeed, the reason Roth failed in his claim was purely positivist:
there was no state law guaranteeing non-tenured professors notice and a hearing. See Roth,
408 U.S. at 566–67.
71 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
72 Id.
73 See Merrill, supra note 15, at 922 (“There is . . . a faint echo of the vested rights
doctrine that played such a large role in nineteenth-century jurisprudence regarding con-
stitutional property: Entitlements are claims against the government that are ‘vested’ as
opposed to claims that are ‘mere expectancies.’  Other than these hints . . . however, the
overwhelming thrust of Roth was to suggest that constitutional property is defined exclu-
sively by its source [of nonconstitutional law] . . . as opposed to its content.” (citation
omitted)).
74 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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hence compliance with these procedures automatically satisfies” the constitu-
tional requirement.75
The positivist trap ultimately proved unworkable.76  In a dramatic rever-
sal, Justice Byron White in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill77
announced that the Court would no longer define property solely on the
basis of the existing contours of state positive law:
[T]he Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, lib-
erty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally
adequate procedures.  The categories of substance and procedure are dis-
tinct.  Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tau-
tology. “Property” cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation
any more than can life or liberty.78
Unfortunately, the Court in Loudermill declined to define property on
the basis of certain essential characteristics.  Instead, it deferred to the right
of the legislature to create “new property.”  However, once that “new prop-
erty” came into existence through positive law, the Court would treat its exis-
tence as an objective and unalterable reality—unalterable, at least, without
process.  The Court reasoned, “The right to due process ‘is conferred, not by
legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee.  While the legislature may
elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once con-
ferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.’”79
The Court failed to articulate a full appreciation of the fact that property
is a pre-political institution that is neither created nor conferred by legislative
power and that the Due Process and Takings Clauses were designed to pro-
tect that institution from government action seeking to divest it, by whatever
means—including defining it out of existence through changes in state
law.80  However, the Court helpfully shied away from its purely Positivist
Approach, and reasserted its right to define “property” for itself.  The Court
75 Merrill, supra note 15, at 892; see also id. at 923 (“In other words, Roth appeared to
require the Court to go along with any and all contractions or expansions on the domain
of property dictated by nonconstitutional law.”).  This, Professor Merrill notes, “would sim-
ply transform due process into the principle of legality,” id. at 924, which is a form of
“procedural nihilism.” Id. at 926.
76 See id. at 922–30.
77 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
78 Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
79 Id. (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in result in part)).
80 While technically a Due Process case, Loudermill is helpful for comprehending the
stakes involved with judicial takings.  If all the Due Process Clause requires is that states
comply with their own process requirements in divesting property, then a state could abol-
ish its property protections without any constitutional limitations.  Likewise, if all the Tak-
ings Clause requires is that the states not divest property rights that they themselves have
recognized, then all the states have to do is cease recognizing (or never recognize) a prop-
erty right to avoid paying compensation.  This “pure positivism” renders the relevant con-
stitutional text a nullity.
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presumed that, given the word “property” appears in the Constitution, the
word must have some substance independent of state law.81
B. Defining Property out of the Positivist Trap
In 1998, the Court issued two important decisions that struggled with
how to define the word “property” in the Constitution.  In Phillips v. Washing-
ton Legal Foundation,82 the Court wandered further out of the positivist trap.
The case concerned “rules requiring lawyers to place client funds in [Interest
on Lawyer Trust Accounts], with the interest going to charitable foundations
that fund legal services for the poor.”83  The question presented was whether
the interest earned on the accounts was a property interest of the client or
the lawyer for purposes of the Takings Clause.84  More specifically, the issue
was, as Professor Merrill put it, a “brainteaser”: “[W]hether the fruits of X’s
property that may only be enjoyed by Y are nevertheless the property of X.”85
In solving the problem, the Court looked—as required by the positivist rule
in Roth—to “independent source[s] such as state law” and concluded that
the property interest was the client’s.86
This ruling, however, appeared to be erroneous.87  While the “English
common law since at least the mid-1700’s” supported the outcome,88 rules
issued by the Texas Supreme Court in 1984 seemed to indicate the property
interest was held by the lawyer.89  This peculiar misapplication of the positiv-
ist approach to defining property appears to have been a quiet rebellion by
the Rehnquist Court against the positivist trap.  The Court insisted that
“[w]hile the interest income at issue here may have no economically realiza-
ble value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are nonetheless valuable
rights that inhere in the property.”90  Notwithstanding its putatively positivist rule
of decision, the Court emphasized possession, control, and disposition—that
is, the right to exclude91—ultimately grounding its takings analysis in a Defi-
nitional Approach to property.  Moreover, this decision would prove consis-
tent with the logic of Loretto.  In Loretto, a violation of the right to exclude in
the form of a permanent physical occupation automatically triggers a per se
taking, regardless of the extent of economic diminution in value,92 and in
81 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
82 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
83 Merrill, supra note 15, at 896.
84 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 n.4 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Phillips, 524
U.S. 156 (No. 96-1578)); Merrill, supra note 15, at 896.
85 Merrill, supra note 15, at 896.
86 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 160, 164 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972)); see Merrill, supra note 15, at 896–97 (quoting Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164).
87 See Merrill, supra note 15, at 897.
88 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165.
89 See Merrill, supra note 15, at 897–98.
90 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (emphasis added); see Merrill, supra note 15, at 898.
91 See infra text accompanying notes 122–25.
92 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 435 (1982).
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Phillips, the right to exclude is evidence of the existence of property for pur-
poses of due process, as a matter of constitutional law even if the thing itself
has no economic value.93
In the case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,94 decided the same year as Phil-
lips, Congress required coal mining companies to contribute to a health care
fund for workers and their families.95  The law required Eastern Enterprises
to pay Apfel an additional amount beyond what was originally agreed upon
in his labor contract,96 and the Court concluded that the law was a regulatory
taking.97  Notable was Justice Breyer’s dissent, where he emphasized the fact
that there was no physical property at issue, and that all prior takings cases
involved physical property, intellectual property, or a specific fund of
money.98  Justice Breyer would have required that all subsequent takings
claims involve an identifiable property right, rather than merely “general lia-
bilities that reduce net worth or general wealth.”99  Regardless of the merits
of Justice Breyer’s suggestion that the scope of the Takings Clause be nar-
rowed to certain understandings of property, his dissent was properly con-
cerned with applying a Definitional Approach to the property prong of a
takings claim.
One year after Eastern Enterprises, the Court once more wrestled with this
issue of defining property in two different cases.  In College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,100 the Court was faced
with determining whether a state statutory false advertising claim is prop-
erty.101  College Savings Bank had issued certificates of deposit to finance
college education, and the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board began to offer a similar product.102  College Savings Bank
sued the government under the Lanham Act for an infringement of its pat-
93 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 169–70; Merrill, supra note 15, at 898 (“The most persuasive
thing the [Phillips] Court said in support of its judgment was that physical things can be
property, even if they have no economic value.”).
94 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
95 Id. at 514–15; Merrill, supra note 15, at 900.
96 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 516–17; Merrill, supra note 15, at 900–01.
97 E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 538.  In what was perhaps a foreshadowing of his eventual
position in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment—
delivering the necessary vote for a five-Justice majority—concluding that the law was not a
taking, but instead a violation of substantive due process. See E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540, 547
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Merrill, supra note 15, at 902.  Justice Kennedy noted that the
doctrine of regulatory takings, which is already conceptually challenging, is even more
arbitrary where there is no clearly defined property interest at stake. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at
542.  This was a prescient observation, since the legal quagmire of Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment appears to have been precipitated by either an inability or refusal of both Justices
Kennedy and Scalia to objectively define the property at stake.
98 Merrill, supra note 15, at 901 (citing E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 554 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
99 Id. at 904.
100 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
101 See id. at 669.
102 Merrill, supra note 15, at 908; see Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 670–71.
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ent, under the theory that Congress could overcome state sovereign immu-
nity under its Section 5 power of the Fourteenth Amendment.103  However,
in attempting to make its due process claim, College Savings Bank seemed to
have difficulty explaining exactly what property interest was at stake, vacillat-
ing back and forth between describing the property as the good will of the
company, lost future revenues, and the very cause of action created by the
Lanham Act itself.104  The Court once more wandered off of its native positiv-
ist territory and articulated a forceful Definitional Approach to the constitu-
tional “property” prong:
The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.
That is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are com-
monly characterized as property.”  That is why the right that we all possess to
use the public lands is not the “property” right of anyone—hence the sar-
donic maxim, explaining what economists call the “tragedy of the com-
mons,” res publica, res nullius.105
Justice Scalia further addressed the claim that College Savings Bank had
a property interest in future revenue and indicated that its fatal “flaw,” ren-
dering it something other than property, was that it did not include the right
to exclude others.106  The Justice explained that “business in the sense of the
activity of doing business, or the activity of making a profit is not property in the
ordinary sense—and it is only that, and not any business asset, which is
impinged upon by a competitor’s false advertising.”107  This “distinction
between the assets of a business (= property) and the activity of doing busi-
ness (≠ property) was,” Professor Merrill contends, “rather obscure.”108  It is
perhaps merely an observation on behalf of the Justice that “the law of prop-
erty requires possession, but the law of tort (specifically, the action for trespass
on the case) will protect interests that fall short of possessory property
rights.”109  In other words, the Court was once again emphasizing the impor-
tance of possession—a concept that encompasses the right to exclude.110
Even in the realm of due process, the Court was not amused by definitions of
property moored in mere economic expectancies, and wished to see an
essential property interest—something that can be used, and most impor-
tantly, something from which the world can be excluded—before it deter-
mined that “property,” as defined by the U.S. Constitution, was actually at
stake.
Professor Merrill argues that Justice Scalia’s approach in College Savings
Bank was something of an innovation:
103 See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 669–70; Merrill, supra note 15, at 908–09.
104 Merrill, supra note 15, at 909.
105 Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
106 Id. at 675; Merrill, supra note 15, at 910.
107 Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675.
108 Merrill, supra note 15, at 911.
109 Id. at 911 n.100 (emphasis added).
110 See infra text accompanying notes 122–25.
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[N]o previous decision of the Court had offered such an unqualified
endorsement of the centrality of the exclusion right.  The right to exclude
has always been described as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property.”  And indeed, no prior
decision had appeared to assert in such an unqualified fashion that the defi-
nition of property is a matter of direct interpretation of the constitutional
language.
. . . Justice Scalia made no effort to reconcile the articulation of a federal
definition of constitutional property with the traditional understanding,
stated as orthodoxy as recently as Phillips, that property rights are created
and their dimensions defined by independent sources such as state law.111
It is true that Roth and its progeny extended the property Cclauses of the
Constitution to cover so-called “new property,” economic expectancies cre-
ated by positive law.  However, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s deviation
from recent Court precedent, his Definitional Approach to the “property”
prong in the Due Process analysis, placing a heavy emphasis on the right to
exclude, seems to be more faithful to the original meaning of the word
“property” as it was used at the time of the ratification of the Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment.112  Regrettably, Justice Scalia would not
show such firmness in defining property in Stop the Beach Renourishment as he
did in College Savings Bank.
The same year as College Savings Bank, the Court decided Drye v. United
States.113 Drye seemed to synthesize the Court’s recent revolution away from
pure positivism toward something of a more Definitional Approach.  Drye
owed $350,000 in taxes, for which several tax liens were filed, and during this
time his mother died intestate, leaving him with an estate valued at
$233,000.114  Drye disclaimed the inheritance under Arkansas law, causing
his sister to inherit the property, who subsequently formed a spendthrift
trust, naming Drye as the lifetime beneficiary.115  The IRS sought to seize the
trust property, claiming that the property “had been funded by property
belonging to Drye—that is to say, the money he stood to inherit had he not
111 Merrill, supra note 15, at 912 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
112 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 16, at 73 (“Use of the words ‘private property’ in the
Takings Clause is clear evidence that the Framers did not regard the institution as subject
for degradation by legislation or judicial administration.  They were all firmly in the natu-
ral law camp . . . .”); Sprankling, supra note 17, at 66 (“[John Locke’s] natural law theory
posits that property rights arise in nature, independent of government. . . . Under this
view, government exists to protect property rights that arise through natural law.”). But see
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823) (“As the right of society, to pre-
scribe those rules by which property may be acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be
drawn into question; as the title to lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend
entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie . . . .”); Sprankling, supra note 17 (noting
that contemporaries of Locke, such as Thomas Hobbes, adopted a purely positivist view of
property rights).
113 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
114 Id. at 52.
115 Id. at 53–54.
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disclaimed.”116  Thus the issue in the case was whether “an Arkansas heir who
exercises the right to disclaim an inheritance has a ‘property’ right in the
disclaimed inheritance.”117  Drye rested his case on what he thought was dis-
positive state law,118 but Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court,
declined to hold that state law was dispositive, announcing instead:
We look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the
property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine
whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as “property” or “rights
to property” within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.119
This, Professor Merrill notes, required the Court to “identify an appro-
priate federal definition of property.”120  Justice Ginsburg concluded that
“the critical question is ‘the breadth of control’ the taxpayer exercises over a
resource,”121 noting that under Arkansas law,
the heir inevitably exercises dominion over the property.  He determines who
will receive the property—himself if he does not disclaim, a known other if
he does.  This power to channel the estate’s assets warrants the conclusion that
Drye held “property” or a “righ[t] to property” subject to the Government’s
liens.122
The “power to channel,” which is the “exercise[ ] [of] dominion” over
property, sounds strikingly similar to the right to exclude articulated in Col-
lege Savings Bank.123  And, as Professor Merrill notes, both the “power to
channel” and the “right to exclude” can be analogized to a “gatekeeper”
function in property rights, which is the “the right to determine who has
access to particular resources and on what terms.”124  Thus, while the Court
does not ignore the relevant state law, when the claimant before it sought a
vindication of “property” rights as protected by the Federal Constitution, the
Court once more claimed its right to define what property is in fact, apart
from any dispositive reliance on state positive law.
116 Merrill, supra note 15, at 914.
117 Id.
118 See Drye, 528 U.S. at 57; Merrill, supra note 15, at 914.
119 Drye, 528 U.S. at 58.
120 Merrill, supra note 15, at 915.  Consequently, under the logic of Drye, if the Court
may define property for purposes of federal law, surely it reserves the right to define prop-
erty for purposes of constitutional law, given that the word “property” appears in the Con-
stitution, and that the Constitution is no less the “supreme Law of the Land” than a federal
statute. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
121 Merrill, supra note 15, at 915 (quoting Drye, 528 U.S. at 61).  The relevant portion
of Drye reads “the breadth of the control.” Drye, 528 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added).
122 Drye, 528 U.S. at 61 (emphases added) (citation omitted).
123 Merrill, supra note 15, at 915 (quoting Drye, 528 U.S. at 61).
124 Id. at 915–16 (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB.
L. REV. 730, at 740 n.37 (1998)).
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C. The Due Process Definitional Approach: Context for Judicial Takings
In the cases of Phillips, Eastern Enterprises, College Savings Bank, and Drye,
the Court abandoned the Positivist Approach: the Court committed itself to
analyzing whether actual property was at stake and ventured into formulating
a coherent definition of property independent of state law, so as not to
render the constitutional protections void in the face of changes in the posi-
tive law.  As we will see, this Definitional Approach is absolutely essential in
the context of a judicial taking.  From a theoretical standpoint, the common
law of property does not change but merely adapts its principles to new situa-
tions through analogical reasoning.  In practice, however, judges innovate all
the time, and sometimes in a dramatic fashion.  Thus, to say that a state could
avoid a taking by simply declaring through the courts that a property right
that once existed no longer exists, or never existed in the first place,125
would resign the reviewing court to the positivist trap—a form of takings
nihilism.  If property is merely a function of the state’s will to power, “judicial
takings” is a contradiction in terms.  But if property has essential characteris-
tics that can be defined apart from state law, then “judicial takings” is a
straightforward application of settled constitutional law.
Yet when presented with the opportunity to address the issue of judicial
takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment, to apply a Definitional Approach con-
sistent with precedent by defining property in the same way as prior regula-
tory takings and due process cases—in terms of the right to exclude or use—
the Supreme Court blinked.
III. THE STOP THE BEACH QUAGMIRE: TAKINGS OR DUE PROCESS?
A. Stop the Beach Renourishment: The Riparian Rights Hypothetical
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection,126 the State of Florida owned the submerged land off the coast of
its beaches in public trust.127  The mean high water line formed the bound-
ary between the private property on the beaches and the state’s submerged
property, a line that shifted over time.128  The legislature passed a bill that
fixed the property line, and after fixing this line, provided that the state
would dredge up sand to raise the state-owned submerged land above the
ocean tide, cutting off the beachfront property owners from their direct con-
nection to the ocean.129  The statute expressly abrogated future rights to
accretion and future liability from erosion.130  It preserved, however, all
125 Justice Potter Stewart once warned, rather prophetically, “[A] State cannot be per-
mitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process
of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never
existed at all.”  Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967).
126 560 U.S. 702 (2010).
127 Id. at 707.
128 Id. at 707–08.
129 Id. at 709–10.
130 Id. at 710.
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other riparian rights, including rights to access, use, and view the water.131
The Florida Supreme Court declared that under Florida law, future accretion
is a “contingent” right, rather than a vested right, and that contact with the
water is not a right.132  Petitioners claimed on certiorari that the right to
future accretion and the right to contact with the water were established by
law, and that the refusal to protect them was a judicial taking, requiring
compensation.133
While the Supreme Court concluded that no judicial taking had
occurred,134 the Justices were hopelessly divided on their reasoning why, and
their divisions revealed deep disagreements, even among the Justices who
would have overruled a decision of the Florida Supreme Court that divested
property owners of their rights.  While both Justice Scalia in his plurality
opinion and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence agree that the potential tak-
ing involved in Stop the Beach Renourishment would have been egregious
enough to reverse, the Justices disagreed over whether to reverse the ruling
as a judicial taking or as a violation of the Due Process Clause.
Justice Scalia concluded that if the common law right to future accretion
and contact with the water was established Florida law, a decision of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, upholding and applying the law in defiance of this estab-
lished right, would amount to a taking, since the judicial opinion would have
the effect of turning private property, by ipse dixit, into public property.135
Justice Kennedy, due to various jurisprudential fears, opposed this adaptation
of regulatory takings doctrine.  His proposed solution—finding a violation of
the Due Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause136—indicates that he
too is willing to grant some protection for property rights in a judicial takings
context, provided the constitutional remedy gives state governments the free-
dom and flexibility to alter the legitimate economic expectations of owners
in property through common law adjudication.137
The means of resolving this disagreement may be found in defining
property.  If the Court were to define property in the same way as prior regu-
latory takings cases, it might be possible for Justices Scalia and Kennedy to
agree upon a coherent judicial takings doctrine that addresses the fears of
each.
B. Wading Through Justice Scalia’s Undefined Approach
Justice Scalia begins his opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment with a
seemingly axiomatic proposition: “Generally speaking, state law defines prop-
erty interests.”138  In support of this he cites Phillips, a peculiar authority
131 Id. at 708, 710.
132 Id. at 712.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 733.
135 Id. at 713–15.
136 Id. at 735, 737.
137 See id. at 736.
138 Id. at 707.
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given that, as discussed above, Phillips asserts a putatively positivist rule while
ultimately relying on a Definitional Approach to property.139  In any event,
the proposition is not incorrect—property law is a state subject matter—but
that is only half of the equation.  While state law generally defines property
interests, it does not (at least in toto) define what property is as a matter of
constitutional law.  The absence of this second half of the equation in Justice
Scalia’s opinion contributes to the doctrinal chaos that follows.
In setting forth his rule of decision, Justice Scalia cites several takings
cases, notably Loretto and Lucas, in order to describe what amounts to a tak-
ing of “property,” yet he only explicitly mentions the right to exclude once,
and in passing.140  Rather than drawing deeply on the definitions of property
implicit and explicit in prior takings and due process cases, Justice Scalia
jumps ahead to define the core of a judicial takings claim: the divestment of
an established common law right.141  If a state court has in the past held, or
referred to in dicta, the existence of a common law property right, such that
the matter of its existence is “settled,” then the court, in interpreting a state
law, effects a taking when it declines to acknowledge or vindicate that
right.142
No doubt the rule seems to be a sensible guarantor of compensation for
previously held entitlements, as far as it goes,143 but the Justice’s proposed
rule of decision very nearly falls into the positivist trap.  Citing Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckworth,144 Justice Scalia declared that “a State, by ipse
dixit, may not transform private property into public property without com-
pensation,”145 but property for the Justice, at least as he defines it in the
judicial takings context, has no fixed meaning.146  One property right may be
“established” in one state but not in another.  Property rights enjoyed in fact,
such as the ancient riparian rights to future accretion and access to the water,
may be denied in due course if an insufficient amount of judicial ink has
been spilled on the subject.  In this positivist world, the reviewing judge does
not look to whether an essential property interest, such as the right to
139 See supra Section II.B.
140 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 713–14.
141 Id. at 715.
142 Id. at 728 (plurality opinion).
143 But see Michael J. Fasano, A Divided Ruling for a Divided Country in Dividing Times, 35
VT. L. REV. 495, 503 (2010) (“[A]ny experienced property law practitioner will tell you that
a good amount of property law—especially some of the most fundamental aspects—simply
is not established in the fashion that Stop the Beach Renourishment seems to require.  It is,
instead, accepted as self evident, often arising from the common law of England—such as
the law involving joint tenancies.  If, as a result, the rights established by such principles are
not protected rights, much of the significance of Stop the Beach Renourishment is illusory.”).
144 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
145 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 715 (quoting Beckworth, 449 U.S. at 164)
(alteration in original).
146 As Justice Scalia put it: “The Takings Clause only protects property rights as they are
established under state law, not as they might have been established or ought to have been
established.” Id. at 732.
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exclude or use, has been divested, but merely considers whether the sover-
eign has deigned to recognize the property’s existence.
Justice Scalia’s view of judicial takings is therefore underinclusive: it cov-
ers some, but not all, judicial takings.  While Justice Scalia insists that review-
ing courts have the right to define “property” as a matter of federal and
constitutional law,147 he shies away from the boldness of his definitional
approach in College Savings Bank.148  And nature abhors a vacuum: Justice
Scalia’s lack of clarity in defining property might have opened the door to
unhelpful—indeed, counterproductive—counter-theorizing on the part of
Justice Kennedy.
C. Searching for a Solution: Justice Kennedy’s Due Process Dilemma
Justice Kennedy recognizes that it is possible for something that looks
like a “judicial taking” to occur, but declines to extend the doctrine of regula-
tory takings to the judicial context.149  In part, this is because of a disagree-
ment over the nature of the common law.  For Justice Scalia, the common
law does not change: rights that have once been acknowledged to exist have
always existed and will always exist, and as new circumstances present them-
selves, these entitlements are merely “clarified.”150  This was, at least, the view
at the time of the founding period.151  But Justice Kennedy insists that the
common law does change through “incremental modifications.”152  Whether
this dispute reflects a semantic difference—“clarify” versus “change”—or a
belief on the part of Justice Kennedy that the courts ought to be free, when
necessary, to cease to acknowledge the existence of a prior right through
clever judicial reasoning, is not entirely clear.  One thing does seem clear,
however: Justice Kennedy fears a takings doctrine that limits the flexibility of
state courts to adapt to new factual circumstances once they know that their
decisions are subject to a takings review.153
If even the smallest change in state positive law could give rise to a tak-
ings claim, then the state government would indeed be paralyzed in its adju-
dication.  This is an entirely justifiable fear, one articulated as far back as
Penn Coal, when the doctrine of regulatory takings first emerged.154  Yet it is
147 See id. at 726 n.9.
148 See id. (“It is true that we make our own determination, without deference to state
judges, whether the challenged decision deprives the claimant of an established property
right. . . . The test we have adopted, however (deprivation of an established property right),
contains within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts.”); cf. supra Section
II.B.
149 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 735–37 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
150 See id. at 722 (plurality opinion).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153 See id. at 736–37.
154 In that same vein, some fear that property rights encourage stasis, and therefore in
order to make room for “inevitab[le]” change that is required to solve social problems ex
ante, collective interests must at times be permitted to legitimately trump this “intractable”
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL308.txt unknown Seq: 22 31-MAR-16 9:48
1218 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
a fear that only arises when a takings analysis is utterly detached from fixed
definitions of property: if there is a per se taking (permanent physical occu-
pation, or complete diminution of economic value) in the regulatory takings
context, even Justice Kennedy would acknowledge the need for compensa-
tion.  It is only in the realm of mere economic expectancies that the takings
analysis must be sensitive to the needs of the state.155
Conversely, Justice Kennedy fears the opposite extreme: the Supreme
Court handing state courts a blank check to trample common law rights.156
As discussed above, Justice Kennedy appears comfortable with adaptations in
the common law.  He is, however, in agreement with the plurality that a
reviewing court must not tolerate radical changes—such as setting aside an
established property right.157  But Justice Kennedy concludes that if such a
dramatic holding were to occur, then the Court should simply invalidate the
decision as a violation of substantive due process.158  Concerning what stan-
dards the Court will use to determine whether the lower court decision is
sufficiently “arbitrary or irrational” to merit due process reversal, the Justice’s
opinion is silent159—a fact brought into high relief by Justice Scalia’s plural-
ity opinion.160  Be that as it may, Justice Kennedy fears that allowing the deci-
sion to rest, provided there was compensation, would signal to state judges
that the Court will acquiesce in radical judicial innovations that unsettle well-
established common law rights.161
As a practical matter, such radical decisions, so shocking to the sensibili-
ties as to be obviously wrong, are hard to conceive—perhaps because they are
so rare.162  Moreover, since Justice Kennedy articulates no standards for this
substantive due process analysis, it is unclear if the Court would ever imple-
individual liberty.  Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conun-
drum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2015–17 (2013).
155 See supra Section I.C.  In arguing for substantive due process in the place of takings,
Justice Kennedy notably cites his Eastern Enterprises concurrence. See Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, 560 U.S. at 736 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  As noted above, see supra text accompa-
nying note 98, Kennedy rightly observes in Eastern Enterprises that it is the lack of an
identifiable property interest in the regulatory takings context that makes the takings anal-
ysis particularly challenging. See supra Section II.B.  Justice Kennedy insists on cleaning the
muddy waters of regulatory takings with the muddier doctrine of substantive due process,
but he could instead define the property interest at stake in the takings claim and obtain
the doctrinal clarity that he so desires.
156 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 737–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157 See id. at 735–37.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 737 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)).
160 Id. at 719–22 (plurality opinion).
161 Id. at 737–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162 See Stern, supra note 27, at 2188 (“[T]he target of the Stop the Beach plurality—the
wholesale elimination of established common law property rights—appears to be an unu-
sual occurrence.  Even among the small group of cases commonly understood as activist,
most are less radical, or produce more ephemeral changes, than commonly assumed.”
(footnote omitted)).
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ment such a failsafe.163  Still, it is a rational fear; the Supreme Court gener-
ally defers to state supreme courts on matters of state law,164 but what
happens when the state supreme court becomes absolutely lawless and
engages in what looks like an extreme judicial taking?  Some remedy, it
would seem, must be available for the abused property owners, and a doc-
trine of judicial takings may not be enough to deter some state judges from
engaging in lawless adjudications.
D. Both-And: Creating a Unified Judicial Takings Doctrine
It should come as no surprise that Justice Kennedy, a judge enamored
with ad hoc balancing tests,165 leapt for a substantive due process solution,
and that Justice Scalia, a judge impatient with unprincipled standards that
grant judges excessive leeway,166 fiercely criticized this proposal.  However,
perhaps this seemingly insurmountable difference in judicial philosophy is
not an “either-or” problem, but an opportunity for a “both-and” solution.
The above discussion reveals two primary concerns raised by the Justices: (1)
judicial takings are real, but if the property being taken is not more precisely
defined, compensation could become too commonplace; and (2) there must
be a remedy for judicial takings, but in some cases, that remedy may need to
be more forceful than mere compensation.  There is then at least one solu-
tion that could achieve a unified judicial takings doctrine: (1) use a Defini-
tional Approach to define property in the context of judicial takings, and (2)
when there is a judicial taking, use a “sliding scale” method to determine
whether the remedy ought to be compensation or complete reversal as a mat-
ter of due process.  This two-step approach might result in more judicial tak-
ings than Justice Kennedy would prefer, and it would lead to more ad hoc
balancing than Justice Scalia would like, but it would be a sensible, workable
compromise that fully addresses the most pressing concerns of both.
IV. STOP THE REACH: SOLVING JUDICIAL TAKINGS BY DEFINING PROPERTY
A. Would the Definitional Approach “Freeze” the Common Law or Impose a
Uniform National Property Law?
The Definitional Approach, defining property according to objective,
essential principles of property, is perhaps the only way to bridge the divide
between Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment.  How-
ever, it is not without its potential criticisms.  Critics of a robust judicial tak-
ings doctrine—echoing Justice Kennedy—fear that defining property
163 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 724 (plurality opinion).
164 See E. Brantley Webb, How to Review State Court Determinations of State Law Antecedent
to Federal Rights, 120 YALE L.J. 1192, 1192 (2011) (noting the existence of “more than a
century of Supreme Court deference to state courts in [the area of property]”).
165 See, e.g., Sprankling, supra note 17, at 62 & n.7.
166 See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 724; Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus,
Judicial Takings and Scalia’s Shifting Sands, 35 VT. L. REV. 423, 431–34 (2010).
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according to essential characteristics would “freeze” the common law by
privileging traditional notions of property rights and punishing the imple-
mentation of newer property innovations.167  They also have a federalism
concern: that defining property in a way that is independent of state law
would impose one version of property law on all fifty states.168  However,
these critiques are in a certain sense a non sequitur—they exaggerate the
possible consequences of judicial takings while ignoring the question
whether the constitutional text defines property for purposes of the Takings
Clause.  Notwithstanding the present-day reliance on “new property,” the
Constitution adopted powerful protections for private property as understood
at the time of the founding.  The original meaning of the word “property” in the
Constitution incorporates objective conceptions of property169 in much the
same way as the Second Amendment, as Justice Scalia contends in District of
Columbia v. Heller,170 incorporates natural law understandings of the individ-
ual right to bear arms.171  Because the Takings Clause, now binding against
the states,172 affirmatively protects a certain understanding of property, regu-
latory takings must necessarily impose a degree of uniformity upon state
property law, privileging essentialist conceptions of property.  And indeed, so
far the doctrine of regulatory takings has privileged “old property” by paying
special attention to the rights to exclude and use.173  The doctrine of judicial
takings would continue the work done by regulatory takings, protecting the
natural rights of individuals in the face of changing state law.
That is not to say the unified judicial takings doctrine proposed in this
Note would undermine “new property”—it simply would not extend the
same degree of takings protection to property that does not include certain
essential characteristics, consistent with the Court’s fear, from Penn Coal
onward, that a judicial takings doctrine that swept too broadly might unduly
167 See David S. Wheelock, Every Grain of Sand: Would a Judicial Takings Doctrine Freeze the
Common Law of Property?, 61 DUKE L.J. 433, 433–34 (2011).
168 See Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1681, 1693–701 (2007); Wheelock, supra note 167; see also Joseph William Singer,
Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1287 (2014) (arguing that property is an
institution created by and adapted to the democratic process).
169 Professor Treanor marshals substantial historical evidence to argue that the doc-
trine of regulatory takings in general is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Tak-
ings Clause.  Treanor, supra note 10, at 782.  He contends that the framers were not
motivated primarily by Lockean liberalism. Id. at 818.  Instead, many framers embraced a
republican ideology, believing that the political majority has a right to take property, id. at
818, 821–22, but that the political process cannot be completely trusted when exercising
the power of eminent domain. See id. at 825, 836.  However, Professor Treanor concedes
that many framers were influenced by liberalism, id. at 823–24, and thus viewed property as
a pre-political institution, id. at 818.  He also concedes that the Takings Clause was at least
a synthesis of liberalism and republicanism. Id. at 819.
170 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
171 See id. at 592–95; Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183,
1238–42 (2012).
172 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
173 See supra Section I.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL308.txt unknown Seq: 25 31-MAR-16 9:48
2016] stop  the  reach 1221
burden the states’ police powers.  The Definitional Approach establishes a
floor of what property actually is, while states would remain free to create
“new property” entitlements in addition to “old property” objective rights.
However, “when so-called ‘new property’ is involved [in a takings case], state
law [would be] the final arbiter on what it includes.”174
B. Property, the Definitional Approach, and Original Meaning
The natural law of property, as understood by the founding genera-
tion,175 William Blackstone,176 John Locke,177 and secured by the English
common law, was rooted in the immutable right of ownership.178  It was also
grounded in a theology of moral duty: people have a moral duty not to tres-
pass upon, to be a nuisance to, or to steal, those things that belong to others,
therefore justifying the owner’s moral right to exclude and use.179  Thus,
174 Robert H. Thomas, Recent Developments in Regulatory Takings Law: What Counts as
“Property?”, 34 NO. 9 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 1 (2011) (observing that after the Stop the
Beach Renourishment decision, “[t]he Ninth Circuit . . . distinguish[ed] between ‘new prop-
erty’ (public employment, welfare assistance, state licenses, etc.) and ‘old property’ (which
includes the more traditional forms of property based in the common law),” concluding
that “[s]tate law defines the former, and thus can curtail or limit it with little constitutional
interference, while federal courts applying the constitution make the final call on the lat-
ter” (quoting Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 1998)));
see Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 963 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We . . . note that a federal
court remains free to conclude that a state supreme court’s purported definition of a prop-
erty right really amounts to a subterfuge for removing a pre-existing, state-recognized
property right.  That is, we need not take a state court at its word as to the kind of analysis
that it is performing.”).
175 See Somin, supra note 11, at 94 (“[T]he dominant view during the Founding era was
that private property is a natural right that no government agency has the power to
change.”).
176 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1–2 (“[T]he right of property . . . [is]
that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”
(emphasis added)).
177 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1980) (1689) (“Whatsoever then . . . [man] hath mixed his
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.  It
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men.” (fourth emphasis
added)).
178 See Somin, supra note 11, at 94–95 (“James Madison, the principal drafter of the
Takings Clause, described ‘the personal right to acquire property’ as a ‘natural right’ that
‘gives to property, when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right.’  In his famous
1792 essay on property, written the year after the enactment of the Bill of Rights, Madison
emphasized that ‘[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort’ . . . .” (cita-
tion omitted)).
179 See 3 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 217 (1787) (“The moment the idea is admitted into society,
that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and
public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.  If ‘Thou shalt not covet,’ and
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while property has always been a domain of state law, it was against the back-
drop of the Union’s collective understanding of objective property rights that
the Congress passed, and the states ratified, the Fifth Amendment.  In the
same way that the Second Amendment incorporates into the Constitution as
binding the natural right to individually bear arms, so the Takings Clause
incorporates a binding moral norm of property as something involving essen-
tial rights that inhere in the property itself—perhaps most important of
which are the right to exclude and use.180
Early proponents of the doctrine of judicial takings recognized just how
important this point is to the doctrine.  Since the common law “recognizes
the right of courts to revisit prior judicial decisions and change them where
they believe appropriate[,] . . . [u]nder a strict positivist view of property, . . .
property rights are subject to modification by the courts.”181  If this were
accepted, we would be forced to conclude that “no property is ‘taken’ when
the courts change the law because change is an intrinsic and recognized ele-
ment of the entire common law system.”182  Moreover, it could be further
argued that if property is a political institution (rather than a pre-political
one), states condition the right to hold property on the possibility that the
courts will change that right at will.183  For this reason, the judicial takings
doctrine “highlight[s] the vacuity of positive property . . . . [W]hether an
action constitutes a regulatory taking will often depend on whether a relevant
court chooses to say that the plaintiff previously held a property right.”184
Thus, defining property is the paramount challenge of regulatory takings.
The courts have repeatedly grappled with the question in both regulatory
takings185 and due process186 cases, but they simply dropped the ball with
judicial takings.  Therefore, it may be that the only way to arrive at a unified
judicial takings doctrine is for the Court to go back to first principles and
once again take up a fundamental question: what is property?
‘Thou shalt not steal,’ were not commandments of Heaven, they must be made inviolable
precepts in every society, before it can be civilized or made free.”); 1 Kings 21 (retelling the
story of King Ahab’s unjust, uncompensated appropriation of Naboth’s vineyard, and sub-
sequently, YHWH’s judgment against the King).
180 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1523–24 (1990)
(noting that “[a]lthough, over the last two hundred years, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly declared that the Constitution itself does not define property but rather adopts state
law (and presumably federal law where applicable), the Constitution does not mandate
this position,” but allows for “a normative definition under which property would be
defined by the Constitution itself” (citations omitted)).
181 Id. at 1527.
182 Id. at 1527–28.
183 See id. at 1528.
184 Id. at 1537.  This observation beautifully captures the core of Justice Kennedy’s con-
cern in Eastern Enterprises, which is that without a clear definition of the property at stake,
regulatory takings involve an inherently problematic inquiry. See supra Section II.B.
185 See supra Part I.
186 See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION
The issue of judicial takings may not stop with obscure and unresolved
areas of the common law, such as beachfront property.  Rather, judicial tak-
ings could conceivably become the newest legal front in the realm of regula-
tory takings.187  Given that the doctrine of judicial takings need only involve
an application of prior regulatory takings principles in the judicial context,
there is every reason for the Court to endeavor to develop a unified judicial
takings doctrine that could equip reviewing courts and signal to lower state
courts that sloppy or crafty opinions that fail to accord proper respect to
essential property rights, as well as those property rights established in state
law, will be at least compensated—and, if serious enough, overturned.  But in
order to formulate this unified judicial takings doctrine, the Court must first
define property.  As one scholar has observed,
The . . . relevant question for judicial takings . . . is whether the Court is
willing to recognize a constitutionally protected property right that is not
recognized by positive law. . . . If the Court is not willing, the concept of
judicial takings . . . may be ethereal at best.188
187 See Shapiro & Burrus, supra note 166, at 429–30 (2010) (“[I]magine . . . that Susette
Kelo never had an opportunity to have her claim heard in the first place because the
Connecticut Supreme Court eviscerated her rights through a novel interpretation of state
property law—that, say, a deed only grants ownership to a particular size and quality of
land, not a fixed location.  That would have been a judicial taking . . . . [W]ithout proper
higher court review, judicial redefinitions of property rights could destroy the Takings
Clause through the back door.”).  For a series of concrete hypotheticals of potential judi-
cial takings situations, see D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U.
RICH. L. REV. 903, 906–10 (2011).  For an analysis of the procedural difficulties in prosecut-
ing a judicial takings claim, see Scott Stevenson, Muddying the Waters: Stop the Beach
Renourishment and the Procedural Implications of a Judicial Takings Doctrine, 42 STETSON L.
REV. 785, 820 (2013) (concluding that “Justice Scalia’s judicial takings doctrine” may prove
to be nothing more than “a mere abstraction—a dusty footnote in the legal casebooks of
the future”).  For an analysis of the sufficiency of state property protections in the absence
of a judicial takings doctrine, see Stern, supra note 27, at 2193 (“On the whole . . . state
courts exercise a high baseline of restraint with respect to property rights through doc-
trines and norms that serve the prophylactic purpose now envisioned for judicial
takings.”).
188 Steven J. Eagle, Judicial Takings and State Takings, 21 WIDENER L.J. 811, 845–46
(2012) (quoting Thompson, Jr., supra note 180, at 1527).
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